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Abstract
Economic models of crime have focused primarily on the goal of deterrence;
the goal of incapacitation has received much less attention. This paper adapts
the standard deterrence model to incorporate incapacitation. When prison only is
used, incapacitation can result in a longer or a shorter optimal prison term com-
pared to the deterrence-only model. It is longer if there is underdeterrence, and
shorter if there is overdeterrence. In contrast, when a fine is available and it is not
constrained by the offender’s wealth, the optimal prison term is zero. Since the
fine achieves first-best deterrence, only efficient crimes are committed and hence,
there is no gain from incapacitation.
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Deterrence and Incapacitation: 
Towards a Unified Theory of Criminal Punishment 
 
 Economic models of law enforcement since Becker (1968) have focused primarily on the 
goal of deterrence (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000, 2007).  Much less examined by economists has 
been the incapacitation function of imprisonment (exceptions are Ehrlich (1981) and Shavell 
(1987)).  Yet actual law enforcement policies almost certainly combine both motives for 
punishment, as reflected by the seeming “overuse” of prison from the perspective of deterrence 
models, which prescribe the use of fines up to the limit of a defendant’s wealth before imposing 
prison time.  Recent three-strikes laws, which imprison an offender for life on a third offense, are 
an example.  (See, for example, Shepherd (2002).) 
 The purpose of this note is to develop an economic model of law enforcement that 
combines the deterrence and incapacitation motives for punishment.  Analytically, this requires 
adding a dynamic element to the standard Becker-Polinsky-Shavell (BPS) deterrence model, 
which treats the potential offender’s decision of whether or not to commit a crime as one-time.  
In contrast, incapacitation envisions some offenders as being habitual (undeterrable) in the sense 
that they commit repeated crimes whenever free, irrespective of the threat of punishment.  In the 
hybrid model, offenders are infinitely lived and potentially commit crimes throughout their lives, 
but they may also be deterred by the threat of punishment.  In this setting, prison potentially 
serves the dual functions of deterring some offenders from ever committing crimes, and 
incapacitating those who do.   
I. The Model 
 Potential offenders have infinite life spans.  At time zero, they each take a random draw 
of the monetary gain from committing a crime, g, which is distributed by the density function 
z(g).  Each offender’s realized g will remain his “type” throughout his life. (Thus, each offender 
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will make the same choice each time he is confronted with a criminal opportunity.)  Time is 
continuous, and g is therefore defined to be the gain per instant of time that an offender is free 
and committing crimes.1   
 Having drawn g at time zero, an offender makes his first criminal decision instantly.  If 
he commits the crime, he enjoys the gain g up to the time he is apprehended, time t.  Once 
apprehended, he is imprisoned for a length of time s and is then released. (Below we also 
consider fines as a form of punishment.)  He then immediately confronts another criminal 
opportunity, and the process begins again. Figure 1 illustrates the time line of events. 
 The apprehension technology is described as follows.2  The time until apprehension, t, is 
a random variable with an exponential density function  
  u(t) = pe–pt,         (1) 
where p is the instantaneous probability of apprehension.  The expected time until apprehension 
is therefore equal to 1/p.  Throughout the analysis, we treat p as fixed and focus on the optimal 
level of punishment (prison term and/or fine).  
A. The Offender’s Gain  
 We first derive the expected lifetime gain to the offender at the point that he makes his 
initial crime decision.  As noted, if he commits the crime he enjoys the gain g continuously up to 
his capture at time t, is imprisoned for s periods, and then is released at time t+s.  Letting δ be 
the disutility of prison per unit of time, we obtain the following net return for the offender’s first 
episode of crime and punishment as a function of g and t:   
                                                 
1
 This assumption is not essential.  We could also assume that the entire gain g is realized at the first instant the 
offender commits the crime. 
2
 This formulation follows Davis (1988).  It is also the approach used by Loury (1979) and Mortensen (1982) to 
describe the process by which firms make technological advances.   
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where r is the discount rate.  We next compute the expected value of this expression by 
weighting it by the density function in (1) and integrating over all t.  This yields the expected net 
gain from the initial crime and punishment as a function of the offender’s type: 
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 As noted, the offender will repeat his commission decision as soon as he is released over 
an infinite horizon.  Given time invariance, the present value of his lifetime net gains from crime, 
denoted G(g), is therefore 
  G(g) =  
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where β(s) is the expected discount factor.  It is computed as follows: 
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Substituting (5) into (4) and solving for G(g) yields 
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 A potential offender will commit a crime at time zero (and at each subsequent criminal 
opportunity) if G(g)>0.  Thus, those offenders for whom 
  g > )(ˆ)1( sge
r
p rs
≡−
−
δ
          (7) 
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become career criminals (i.e., the commit crimes whenever free).  Note that ∂ gˆ /∂s=pδe–rs>0, 
which provides the basis for the deterrence function of prison.  It will also be useful to note that  
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Thus, as expected, increasing the length of the prison term reduces the lifetime return from 
crime, both because it imposes marginal disutility of δ, but also because it deprives the offender 
of the incremental gains from additional crimes.  
B. The Social Cost of Crime 
 Now consider the cost of crime to society.  This consists of the usual three components: 
the harm suffered by victims at each instant that a criminal is free and committing crimes, 
denoted by h; the cost per unit of time of imprisoning an offender, denoted by c;3 and the cost of 
enforcement, k(p), which we take as fixed.  As described above, the harm to victims is incurred 
continuously up to the time when the offender is apprehended, t, while the cost of imprisonment 
is incurred from t up to t+s.   Further, these costs are repeated during all future episodes of crime 
and imprisonment.  The cost of enforcement, however, is incurred only once.  Proceeding as 
above, we calculate the present value of harm plus imprisonment costs: 
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Again, substituting for β(s) from (5) and solving for C yields  
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 Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to s yields 
                                                 
3
 The disutility of imprisonment suffered by offenders will also be included as a social cost in the welfare function 
of the hybrid model below. 
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which is ambiguous in sign, depending on the relative magnitudes of c and h.  Specifically, if 
c>h, (10) is positive, and costs are minimized by setting s=0.  In this case, the cost of 
imprisonment is greater than the harm from crime, so society is better off not imprisoning 
offenders.  Conversely, if c<h, (10) is negative, and costs are minimized by making s infinite.  In 
this case, the cost of imprisonment is less than the harm from crime, so society is better off 
imprisoning offenders for life after their first offense.  This trade-off represents the economic 
approach to incapacitation as studied by Shavell (1987).4   
C. Optimal Punishment in the Hybrid Model 
 Social welfare in for the hybrid model consists of the gain to offenders less the social 
costs of crime, summed over those offenders who commit crimes.5  Formally, 
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The optimal prison term is found by maximizing (12) with respect to s.  The resulting first order 
condition, assuming an interior solution, is  
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4
 Shavell also considers the case where the harm caused by an offender, h, decreases over his lifetime.  Thus, 
assuming c<h initially, the offender should be imprisoned but then released when c>h. 
5
 I make the usual assumption that the gains to the offender should be counted as part of social welfare.  See the 
discussion of this point in Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p.48, note 12).   
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As usual, the net gain to the marginal offender in this expression, )ˆ(gG , is zero and therefore 
drops out.  Substituting for the sg ∂∂ /ˆ , ∂G/∂s, and ∂C/∂s terms from above and simplifying 
yields 
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The left-hand side of this condition is the marginal deterrence benefit of increasing s, as reflected 
by the savings in harm to victims plus punishment costs.  This term is essentially identical to that 
in the standard BPS deterrence model; the only difference is that the saved punishment costs are 
in present value terms.   
 The right-hand side of (14) is the marginal cost of increasing s.  This consists of the usual 
cost of lengthening the prison term in the form of the incremental cost of imprisonment, c, plus 
the disutility to the offender, δ.  In the standard BPS model, these would be the only components 
of the marginal cost term.6  Here, however, there is an additional term, g–h, which represents the 
foregone net benefits from those crimes that career criminals (i.e., those who are not deterred) 
are unable to commit because they are kept in prison longer. This reflects the incapacitation 
effects of imprisonment.7  Generally, the sign of this term may be positive or negative, 
depending on whether the expected gain to undeterred offenders is larger or smaller than the 
harm they impose on victims, given optimal punishment. If this term is negative, the marginal 
cost of prison is reduced, making the optimal prison term longer.  In this case, prison serves an 
incapacitation function by reducing the amount of time offenders have to commit further crimes, 
which on average are inefficient (given that E(g|g≥ *)(ˆ sg )<h).   
                                                 
6
 See, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (2007), equation (6).  
7
 Another way to interpret the right-hand side of (14) is that g+δ represents the marginal cost of a longer prison term 
to the offender in terms of the foregone gains from crime plus the disutility of prison, while the c–h term represents 
the social trade-off associated with incapacitation. 
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 In contrast, if this extra term is positive, then the optimal prison term should actually be 
reduced compared to the pure deterrence model.  The reason for this anomalous effect is that, if 
undeterred offenders on average gain more than the harm they are imposing, there is a net social 
cost of keeping them in prison longer because it prevents them from committing further 
“efficient” crimes.  Taken together, the preceding results show, surprisingly, that introducing 
incapacitation into the economic model of crime can result in either a higher or a lower optimal 
prison sentence compared to the pure deterrence model. 
D. Fines and Prison 
 Now let us add fines as an additional form of punishment.  Obviously, fines can have no 
effect on incapacitation, but they may reduce (or eliminate) the need to rely on prison for 
deterrence, in which case it can used solely for incapacitation.  Let f be the amount of the fine, 
which is imposed on an offender each time he is apprehended.   
 Note first that the gain to the offender has to be altered to reflect the fine.  Proceeding as 
above, we obtain  
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as the lifetime gain from crime for an offender of type g.  The threshold level of g above which 
the offender becomes a career criminal is thus 
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 Social costs must also be amended to reflect the fine revenue.  Again, proceeding as 
above we obtain  
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as the present value of harm plus net punishment costs (i.e., the cost of imprisonment less the 
expected fine revenue).  The resulting expression for welfare is 
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where, notice, the fine revenue drops out since it is merely a transfer payment.  Thus, (18) differs 
from (12) only by the lower limit of integration. 
 The optimal punishment scheme involves choosing f and s to maximize (18).  The usual 
result in the standard BPS deterrence model in this case is that it is never optimal to impose a 
prison sentence unless the fine is constrained by the offender’s wealth.  The intuition is that, 
since both the fine and prison are equally effective in deterring crime, it would never be optimal 
to use the costly tool (prison) until the costless tool (a fine) has been fully exhausted.8  The 
question is whether this same result holds in the hybrid model.   
 To answer this question, we first derive the optimal fine, assuming no limit on the 
offender’s wealth. Setting the derivative of (18) with respect to f equal to zero and solving for f 
yields 
  f* =  h/p + )1( rse
r
c
−
− .       (19) 
Thus, the optimal fine equals the social cost of a crime, which consists of the harm suffered by 
victims plus the present value of the expected cost of imprisoning the offender, both 
appropriately adjusted to reflect the probability of apprehension.  In the case where the prison 
term is zero, (19) reduces to the usual expression for the optimal fine, f*=h/p. 
                                                 
8
 See Polinsky and Shavell (2007, p. 411) for a more formal proof.  
 9 
 Now differentiate (18) with respect to s, given f=f*: 
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To determine whether a positive prison term is optimal, we evaluate this derivative at s=0 and 
check whether it is positive or negative.  Note first that hfg =)0*,(ˆ , in which case (20) becomes 
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where the negative sign follows by the fact that the integration is over g≥h.  Thus, the expression 
in parentheses must be negative.  It follows that s*=0.  Intuitively, since the fine is set to achieve 
optimal (first-best) deterrence, only efficient crimes are committed.  Thus, from an economic 
perspective, there is no social gain from incapacitating repeat offenders.  In the prison-only 
formulation above, in contrast, it was possible that there were incapacitation benefits since the 
optimal prison term possibly resulted in underdeterrence at the optimum.   
 In the case where the fine is limited by the offender’s wealth (i.e., w<f*), the foregoing 
logic implies that a positive prison term may be desirable for purposes of incapacitation.  The 
trade off is the same as that for the prison-only case. 
 As a final point, it is interesting to note that the conclusions from the hybrid model shed 
light on the difficulty that the literature has had in explaining the pervasiveness of escalating 
penalty schedules for repeat offenders.  If deterrence is efficient, as in the model with both fines 
and prison, then there is no reason to punish repeat offenders more severely, either for purposes 
of deterrence or incapacitation, because they are in fact acting efficiently.  An escalating penalty 
scheme can therefore only be optimal if there is underdeterrence of first-time offenders.9   
                                                 
9
 See, for example, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p. 67), Shavell (2004, p. 529), 
Miceli and Bucci (2005), and Polinsky and Shavell (2007, p. 438).  
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Figure 1.  Time line of crime and punishment over an infinite horizon. 
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